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Examine the bookshelves of any lakeside cottage, and you are likely to find one or more novels.  
We care a great deal about fiction, a love affair with many different psychological motivations.  
In this paper, however, I’d like to examine whether our affection for novels is philosophically 
warranted.  Is it a rational love?  Is reading novels something that philosophers like us should 
spend our time doing?  Are we right to convert our vacation reading to our research vocation? 
 
Historically, novels have been derided with the kind of scorn currently reserved for television 
and video games.  While we may want to put Crime and Punishment in a different category from 
CSI, an initial examination suggests that for every noble purpose we might assign to novels, 
some other genre does it better.   Following the Russian formalists, narratologists distinguish 
three levels of analysis in their study of narratives1:  first, there is the text, the physical medium 
in which the story is presented.  Second, the story, which can be captured by a close paraphrase 
of the text (and which is fully preserved in translation).  And third, the “fabula”, which is the 
chronologically ordered series of events the story narrates.  For example, Crime and Punishment 
is a text in Russian; the story begins with the fevered meditations and wonderings of 
Raskolnikov, which eventually sparks a flashback to a scene six weeks prior to the story 
opening, an overheard tavern conversation proposing, hypothetically, a murder justified on 
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utilitarian grounds.  In the story the Petersburg wanderings precede the tavern scene.  The fabula, 
in contrast, is the timeline of these events, in the order of their occurrence “in reality”.  In the 
fabula, the overheard conversation occurs before the other events. 
 
Considered as texts, novels offer the aural pleasures of style and voice, but for the music of 
language one ought to prefer poetry, and for the variety of voices, drama.  But of course we read 
novels mainly for their stories, tolerating weaknesses of style and losses in translation.  
Aesthetically, the standards for good stories descend from Aristotle’s Poetics, which I need not 
rehearse except to note that novels fare poorly compared to several other forms, including short 
stories.  In general the organic union of character, action, and plot (with its rise, climax, and 
denoument) is exemplified in great short stories (and drama).  Compared to these, novels are 
sprawling, flabby, and wasteful. 
 
One might argue that the aesthetic import of stories has little to do with their overall formal 
properties but rather with the more general powers of narrative itself.  Narrative comes first in 
the lives of cultures and individuals and remains the basic framework for communicating and 
understanding one’s experience, a connection to life so basic that many propose that 
consciousness, the self, and even the natural world be explained in narrative terms.2  In this 
trend, the value of stories shifts from the aesthetic to the intellectual and epistemic.   Stories are 
the vehicles of knowledge, and insofar as stories reflect human life, the knowledge stories impart 
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is ethical.  We shift, then, from the aesthetic properties of stories to a consideration of content, 
what the stories are about, moving to the third level of analysis, the fabula.  Here novels 
encounter a different kind of objection, one reminiscent of Plato’s rejection of mimesis.  Novels 
are fiction; their fabulas do not exist.  Any conclusion based on the content of a novel is based on 
false premises, by definition.  We may embrace narrative for its cognitive fit with our lived 
experiences, but for communicating knowledge and informing our ethical lives, we ought to 
prefer history, biography, and autobiography over all forms of fiction.  Let us call this the 
epistemic problem of fiction. 
 
The epistemic problem of fiction is especially troubling due to the many areas of life in which 
our understanding is informed mainly through stories.  My knowledge, such as it is, of 19th 
Century English country life rests on the novels of Austen, the Bröntes, and Eliot – exclusively.  
All are fictional, and as such I should consider Middlemarch as fantastic as Middle Earth.  
Perhaps even more troubling, I make relative judgments of verisimilitude among these authors, 
trusting Eliot the most and Emily Brönte the least.  But I make these assessments strictly on the 
texts themselves, unaided by any genuine historical research.  Middlemarch seems to me to be 
more plausible that Wuthering Heights. Eliot’s tone, narrative voice, and point of view are 
steadier than the more “romantic” Brönte sisters.  But surely it is a mistake to convert style into 
epistemic authority.   In the absence of factual knowledge, I evidently make judgments about the 
content of the novels using my own experience as a reference point, but if so it would be circular 
reasoning to regard the novel as adding to knowledge I already have.  The epistemic problem 
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does not limit itself to period details of costume and props.  It encompasses my understanding of 
important aspects of psychology and sociology.  On the topic of orphans, I think of Dickens.  On 
the French bourgeoisie, Flaubert.   It extends finally into the moral dimension.  To understand 
the collision of consequentialist and deontological ethics, I turn to Crime and Punishment. I’ll 
often refer to Raskolnikov’s crime and all its consequences as if these were facts.  I’m not alone 
– the moral authority of novels is widespread in philosophy.3 
 
In short, we trust novels, but the epistemic basis for this trust is obscure.  One could follow 
Plato’s lead and consign fiction to the flames, in favor of edifying nonfictions based in virtuous 
realities.  But I prefer instead to examine the epistemology of fiction, especially novels, to 
reconstruct a view of “fictional veracity” that grants the fundamental point that fictional fabulas 
are nonexistent but that novels nonetheless offer genuine evidence for claims not already held by 
readers.  I propose that not every fiction is equivalent in this regard; the novel will turn out to be 
distinctive.   
 
As a step toward a positive account of novelistic epistemology, we might consider two common 
deployments of fictions, the example and the thought experiment.  Logically, examples fill two 
roles, as illustrations and as evidence.  As illustrations, they display the consequences of views 
that rest on other grounds.  As such, they fall outside the logic and epistemics of arguments.  As 
evidence, an example forms part of the inductive basis for a more general conclusion.  But to be 
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part of a sound argument, an example has to be true.  Once again, fiction is illegitimate in this 
role. 
 
A more complex case is the thought experiment, and fictions, including novels, are often cited in 
this application.  A thought experiment is designed to motivate and clarify intuitions and 
commonly plays an important role in argument.  Generally, a thought experiment draws out the 
consequences of a claim;  those consequences are either welcome or absurd.  In the normal 
function of the thought experiment, the narrative is logically determined by the claim in question.  
For example, in Judith Thompson’s classic thought experiment, we are asked to imagine 
ourselves suddenly and involuntarily tethered to another person, a famous violinist, who depends 
for life on the unbreakable umbilicus between us.4  Butler asks what our obligations to the other 
person are, in the context of principled arguments against abortion.  If we do not feel obligated to 
spend nine months tethered to another person, then it seems irrelevant that the person is an 
unborn fetus.  Thus, the thought experiment implies that the alleged personhood of the fetus may 
not be decisive with respect to the morality of abortion.   
 
A good thought experiment should illuminate a conclusion that can be deduced from the 
combination of stipulated conditions and general principles.  The cleverness of the thought 
experiment derives from the author’s ingenuity in constructing its premises.  Beyond those 
conditions, however, the thought experiment is all clockwork, even when the consequences are 
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elaborated at great length and embellished with descriptive detail.  A thought experiment is the 
narrative equivalent of an analytic sentence.  But novels (and literary fictions in general) are not 
like this.  The initial conditions of a literary narrative may greatly constrain the outcome but do 
not determine it.  However worked out the initial conditions of a novel may be, there is always a 
residual contingency, always some aspect of the story that exceeds what must unfold to make the 
story coherent in its parts.   
In their capacity to go beyond their premises, then, novels are more like synthetic truths.  For 
example, Einstein grappled with the theory of special relativity by imagining himself chasing a 
beam of light.  What would happen, he wondered, in his thought experimental situation, given 
the available theories of light?  Now imagine the same premise in the hands of Kafka or 
Calvino…. 
 
Contingency appears in fiction either as a character’s free choice or as unanticipated events in 
the world of the story.  In either case the reader cannot entirely foresee what will happen next.  
Nonetheless, unfolding events in the story modify the understanding of the initial conditions.  
From this clue we hypothesize a different epistemic role for fictions, and especially novels (that 
is, works where contingency is most on display).  Fictions of this type, open and contingent 
fictions, resemble experimental science; the novelist and the empirical scientist are close kin.   
The novelist and scientist are separated by the gulf of the legendary two cultures,5 and indeed in 
many operational details the two are very different, but these are potentially superficial 
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differences between two fundamentally similar modes of discovery.  To clarify this conjecture, 
I’d like to work out the analogy in some detail.  This redescription of the processes of writing a 
novel or constructing an experiment does not depict a literal or chronological process, but rather 
a conceptual procedure, an edifice that may be constructed piecemeal in the process of 
articulating a fiction or an experiment. 
 
The scientist and the novelist both construct what I will call “model systems.”  Their constructs 
are systems in that they consist of many interdependent parts.  The systems are semi-
autonomous:  they depend partly on the choices and inclinations of their creators, but also can 
grow and alter outside of the direct intentions of the scientist or writer.  The scientist’s system 
will run in her lab, involving dynamic objects and apparatus.  The novelist’s system will “run” in 
her imagination.   Both creators will make observational reports on their systems, and both will 
eventually distill and elaborate their observations into a narrative of the system in operation.  The 
system is a model in that it is in a special relationship to the real world.  Both kinds of system are 
parts of the world and both behave according to laws of nature.  (The novelist’s imagination will 
be implemented in her brain; the scientist’s experiment will be implemented in the lab.)   Both 
systems will contain particular entities that will interact within the system.  Entities of interest to 
the scientist can include any entity or group of entities amenable to experimental manipulation – 
animal, vegetable, or mineral.  The novelist’s entities especially include characters but also 
settings and props.  Both creators construct and observe the behavior of particular entities, but 
their interest is not in the particular tokens but in the types they represent.  For the scientist, the 
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behavior of her particular experimental subjects is used to question generalizations that she will 
attempt to discuss explicitly.  For the novelist, the narrated behaviors may not inform explicit 
generalizations, but the interest is nonetheless in the characters as exemplifying more general 
dynamic relationships.6   This is the first sense of “model”, the capacity of the system to 
represent the dynamism of a much more complex reality that includes the system and many 
variations and expansions of it.  The constructed system is a model in another sense as well, 
namely, in the connotation of the distinctness and separateness of the model from reality.  
Although both systems are real parts of the natural world, the entities manipulated by the novelist 
and the scientist are removed from that world, and their systems run inside a bubble that 
insulates them from leakage from or into the outside world.  The novelist’s system is protected 
by ontology.  Raskolnikov (the character) can menace people all he wants but we readers are 
never at risk.  The scientist’s creatures are real but thanks to scientific practice enjoy a 
comparable separateness from the rest of the world.  This isolation is enacted in deployment of 
experimental controls.  By controlling all the causal conditions except for the condition of 
interest, the experimenter in effect brackets the world, to create an artificial subworld in which 
only one cause is effective.  The outcome, if any, is unaffected by the myriad contingent 
influences that would normally interact in the real world.  Thus the model systems of both the 
novelist and the scientist are purified from outside influences, and exempt from most or all of the 
buffets of ordinary reality.  In this way models are unrealistic.  Like a model airplane, an 
experiment or a story is similar to a part of the world,  yet functionally disconnected from any 
real context. 
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This initial look at model systems emphasizes the resemblance of writing and experimentation, 
analogizing the exercise of novelistic imagination with the conduct of controlled laboratory 
experiments.  If the analogy is useful, it recasts writing as a lab exercise.7  But the analogy also 
emphasizes elements of scientific practice that are usually not marked, recasting science as a 
creative exercise.  This emerges as we turn to the stages of creation.  Both fiction and science 
necessarily operate from a standpoint, comprising two main elements.  First there is a set of 
background assumptions, a presumed “world” of the model system.  In this world certain types 
of entities are real and certain laws hold (and others do not).  Both scientist and novelist will 
make some of these explicit, providing a setting for the model, for example  “evolutionary 
theory” or “Paris”.  Even if not explicit, these background conditions are common knowledge 
shared by authors and readers, and violations will be jarring and grounds for rejecting the work 
outright.  These background conditions comprise the “local ontology” of the model system.  This 
ontology is often conventional.  For the scientist it is given in materialism and the assumptions of 
normal science in the particular discipline she works.  The novelist can erect her background 
with equal efficiency by signaling her genre.  But in addition to ontology, both creators must also 
choose a “local epistemology”.  In fiction, this is the point of view, which in contemporary 
narratology has been called “focalization”.  Meike Bal characterizes it thus:  “Focalization is the 
relationship between the ‘vision,’ the agent that sees, and that which is seen.”   (Narratology, 
146)  The focalizer in fiction is the standpoint from which the action is reported.  Proust is 
focalized through a single mind, while Hemingway is focalized from outside his actors.  Even 
the most “objective” writing styles nonetheless are focalized through the choice of detail, style of 
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description, pacing and ordering of elements, and many other choices.  Thus focalization is at 
once an enabling and disabling of different possibilities of insight, as writers will allow us to 
know what some characters think and see, or not, or disclose certain features of the story world, 
or not.  By choosing what to focalize, the writer excludes myriad possibilities as well.  Some of 
these exclusions are irrelevant to the story, but others may be decisive.   
 
Focalization has a strict parallel in science, found in the choices experimenters make in method 
and methodology.   The methods section of a scientific article is the scientist’s equivalent of 
focalization.  It explicitly describes what the scientist will do and not do, and what can be 
observed and what will escape observation.  Like the novelist, the scientist makes many choices 
here, and these choices are contingent.  There is nothing in science or its methods that dictate 
how an experiment must be observed.   
 
I’m emphasizing this parallel to undercut a conventional contrast between science and fiction, a 
contrast between “objectivity” and a variety of terms for epistemic squishiness often attached to 
fiction:  subjective, imaginative, personal, etc.   Focalization (in fiction) and methodology (in 
science) are choices of human creators, and are fully subject to all the influences of interest and 
convention arising through an individual’s life experience in particular social circumstances.  
Accordingly, in science alternative explanations are excluded not by falsification but simply by 
omission.  This is in agreement with the feminist critiques of science espoused by several 
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authors, a point to which I’ll return.8  In a novel, the exclusion and limitation of insight is 
prominent.  We are led to wonder what is happening off the current page we read.  In science, 
however, the limitations and exclusions are disguised.  In many ways the rhetoric of scientific 
writing, with its passive voices, passion for quantification and graphical contrasts, and 
formalized styles, operates to distract us from the underlying free play and its doubts.  If a 
scientific paper were narrated as a fiction, these focalizations would be prominent.  (Scientists 
know this, as is visible in their memoirs or in any conversation with a working scientist.  Insiders 
read scientific papers with the same critical apparatus that literary critics bring to novels.   As 
writers, scientists modulate their focalization with great sophistication.  Each of the major 
journals in any field has its own style.  To convert a submission to Science to one appropriate for 
Nature or Proceedings of the National Academy of Science requires a complete rewriting.) 
 
In short, both novelists and scientists construct model systems and watch them run, making their 
observations from particular chosen standpoints.  Their interest, and ours, is not in the concrete 
particulars of the experiment but in what those particulars imply about the world outside the 
model system.  Novels make implicit claims about the real world, while scientific reports are 
more likely to draw their conclusions explicitly, but the generalization from model to reality is 
similar.  However, these comparisons of literary and scientific process do not yet determine their 
relative entitlements as knowledge.  To continue the exploration, then, we carry the twin 
processes forward another step.  How are novels and scientific reports received?   Most science 
is (Kuhnian) normal science, with its outcomes in conformity with the background conditions.  
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They cast their light on an unknown corner of nature, but reveal only what was already expected 
there.  Most novels are similarly “normal”.  In most novels, and especially in genre novels, we 
watch the action unfold in satisfying representations of aspects of life we already understand.  
However, in both science and fiction the normal sometimes breaks.  In Kuhnian terms, an 
anomaly occurs – an outcome in violation of the normal expectations.  There are novelistic 
analogues.  For example, toward the middle of Crime and Punishment Raskolnikov confesses his 
double murder to Sonya, the virtuous young woman forced into prostitution in order to support 
her family.  Raskolnikov’s crime horrifies Sonya and naturally offends her deepest moral 
convictions.  But instead of recoiling she throws her arms around Raskolnikov, crying “There is 
no one more unfortunate than you in the whole world!”   Then she declares that she will never 
leave him.  Before Dostoevsky, this behavior – responding to a confession of murder with a 
profession of love – would have been inconceivable. 
 
Our reaction to novelistic and scientific anomaly is initially skeptical.  How could this be?  
(Could any human behave like Sonya?) This leads to attempted replication.  If replication fails, 
the initial report is rejected (remember cold fusion?); in literature, the anomalous novel is 
rejected as implausible.  In science, as the anomaly is replicated the discipline enters a period of 
crisis, eventually resolved through a paradigm shift.  In literature, something similar may occur.  
The reader may search for parallel anomalies in other literary works or in life, or authors may 
adopt standpoints in which anomalies are ripe for replication.  Following Dostoevsky’s repeated 
presentations of contradictory characters like Sonya, novels turned psychological and existential.  
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Sonya would be impossible in the world of Jane Austen, but a full citizen in the worlds of 
Camus, Beauvoir, or Sartre, let alone Nietzsche or Freud. 
 
The processes of reception and acceptance are of course more complicated than this sketch 
allows, but I hope there’s enough detail to identify a parallel epistemic trajectory, as follows:  
We provisionally accept the model systems of both scientists and novels as models of the world, 
which acceptance is always modulated by our existing beliefs and subject to further 
modification.  Overall, then, the analogies I’ve drawn provide a common epistemology for 
fiction and science.  Because novels and experiments are model systems, we are interested in 
their generalization and not in the particular entities narrated.  So we can believe in Crime and 
Punishment even though its characters are not real.  We believe in its descriptions of the 
dynamics of a model world insulated from the real world, but a part of it nonetheless.  This is a 
provisional belief, one we are prepared to abandon, and a limited belief, qualified by the 
standpoint we recognize as shaping and limiting Dostoevsky’s and his character’s perspectives 
and perceptions.  But it would be a mistake to regard this as an inferior sort of knowledge, 
compared to empirical science.  Science, I’ve argued, is no different.  We discard the particulars 
of the scientific report in favor of generalizations that hold outside of the model system, but these 
beliefs are also provisional and qualified by standpoints.  We should be critical and skeptical 
readers of both novels and science, but both forms of writing can legitimately extend our 
knowledge of the world. 
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I’d like to conclude by coordinating these comments with standpoint epistemology as developed 
in feminist philosophy of science over the last few decades.  Standpoint theory generally 
interprets standpoints as positions in social, political, and economic hierarchies, and proposes 
that relatively oppressed positions afford epistemically superior standpoints.9  The oppressed 
must anticipate the views of the oppressor along with his or her own, while the oppressor 
remains comfortably blind to the perspectives of the oppressed.  The dual viewpoint of the 
oppressed affords a better chance to perceive what’s really happening.  Here, however, I 
understand standpoint more broadly, as the free play of focalization.  One’s social position is part 
of it, along with one’s personality, free choices, and many other contingencies can affect what is 
seen and what is understood.  But the epistemic gain of multiple standpoints remains.  The ability 
to move from one standpoint to another maximizes the visibility and sensibility of the world.  
Each standpoint excludes more than it includes, but the exclusions are different from standpoint 
to standpoint.  Novels are therefore important.10  These considerations validate one’s literary 
research – and vacation -- commitments.  But for the same reasons, we should be reading our 
science as well.  However, we should be reading our science as if it were fiction, and not as if it 
pronounces final and unassailable truths.   
 
Literature has been promoted for its role in ethics.11  Here I’ve suggested that this is legitimated 
by the epistemics of fiction.  Insofar as novels tend to explore the limits of human action, novel-
based understanding is highly relevant to ethics.  Not all science expands our conception of 
human action, but some does, and these perspectives cannot be excluded either.  The papers 
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presented at this session  portray narrative and especially fictional narrative in its full glory as a 
tool for human understanding.   
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